The Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) established a laboratory network within the GHSI community to develop collective surge capacity for radionuclide bioassay in response to a radiological or nuclear emergency as a means of enhancing response capability, health outcomes and community resilience. GHSI partners conducted an exercise in collaboration with the WHO Radiation Emergency Medical Preparedness and Assistance Network and the IAEA Response and Assistance Network, to test the participating laboratories (18) for their capabilities in in vitro assay of biological samples, using a urine sample spiked with multiple high-risk radionuclides (  90 Sr,   106 Ru, 137 Cs, and 239 Pu). Laboratories were required to submit their reports within 72 h following receipt of the sample, using a pre-formatted template, on the procedures, methods and techniques used to identify and quantify the radionuclides in the sample, as well as the bioassay results with a 95% confidence interval. All of the participating laboratories identified and measured all or some of the radionuclides in the sample. However, gaps were identified in both the procedures used to assay multiple radionuclides in one sample, as well as in the methods or techniques used to assay specific radionuclides in urine. Two-third of the participating laboratories had difficulties in determining all the radionuclides in the sample. Results from this exercise indicate that challenges remain with respect to ensuring that results are delivered in a timely, consistent and reliable manner to support medical interventions. Laboratories within the networks are encouraged to work together to develop and maintain collective capabilities and capacity for emergency bioassay, which is an important component of radiation emergency response.
INTRODUCTION
Following a radiological or nuclear (RN) emergency, workers, first responders and the public may be internally contaminated with the radionuclide(s) involved.
Rapid assessment of internal contamination, through in vitro or in vivo bioassay, provides timely information for medical intervention, if necessary, and provides assurance to those who do not require further examination. Accordingly, emergency radionuclide bioassay capacity is essential to support emergency response. In a large-scale emergency, it is possible that laboratories from other regions or other countries may be called upon for assistance. The Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) is an informal network of countries formed in 2001 to ensure health-sector exchange and coordination of practices in confronting risks to global health posed by chemical, biological and radio-nuclear threats, as well as by pandemic influenza (1) . The member countries/organizations of the GHSI are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Commission. The World Health Organization (WHO) is a technical advisor to the GHSI. As part of the GHSI partnership, an annual meeting of Health Ministers is held to foster dialog on topical policy issues and promote collaboration. Other initiatives involving senior health officials as well as policy, technical and scientific personnel take place on a regular basis, focused on risk management; communications; chemical events; radio-nuclear threats; pandemic influenza; and global laboratory cooperation.
The GHSI Radio-Nuclear Threats Working Group (RNWG) was created to facilitate sharing and collaboration on policies and capability development to enhance public health preparedness and response to radiological and nuclear threats. As a result of discussions and consultations, the RNWG established an informal laboratory network to improve collective capabilities and capacity for radionuclide bioassay within the GHSI community. Within this network, laboratories can share their expertise through training activities, exercise their preparedness through intercomparisons, develop new capabilities through collaborative R&D, and assist in bioassay analysis when additional laboratories are required following an emergency.
In 2013, the network laboratories were surveyed on their current capabilities in emergency radionuclide bioassay and the technological and operational gaps they had identified in this area. Based on the survey results, the RNWG decided to conduct two exercises. The first exercise was organized in 2014 to test the participating laboratories for their response capabilities in assaying a single radionuclide ( 241 Am) in a urine sample, performing internal dose assessment, and providing advice on medical intervention when necessary. Results for the first exercise have been published (2) . The second exercise, organized in early 2016 and reported in this paper, is to test the participating laboratories (18) for their response capabilities in assaying multiple radionuclides in a single urine sample, focusing on the procedures and methods/ techniques used and the results obtained by the participating laboratories. This exercise was in collaboration with the Radiation Emergency Medical Preparedness and Assistance Network, World Health Organization (WHO REMPAN) (3) and the Response and Assistance Network, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA RANET) (4) . Some laboratories from the REMPAN collaborating centers and liaison institutions and the ones that had registered their bioassay capabilities in the RANET database participated in this exercise, together with laboratories in the GHSI network.
METHODS AND MATERIALS

Exercise design
A scenario (unspecified) based on a severe nuclear power plant accident was adopted, with a simplified selection of radionuclides for the purpose of this exercise. (5) although in another accident these may be very different as a result of many factors, such as the design of the reactor and the technologies used to reduce the source term. The ratios of these radionuclides in the intake by an individual would also be very different as the dispersion and deposition of these radionuclides may be controlled by different parameters. Nevertheless, these ratios were used as a reference when selecting the intake activities of the radionuclides in this project.
NCRP 161 (6) introduces a new operational quantity, the Clinical Decision Guide (CDG), for physicians to consider the need for medical treatment of internal contamination. The CDG value is the intake of a radionuclide that satisfies both the stochastic health effect criterion (a 50 y committed effective dose (CED) of 0.25 Sv for adults) and the deterministic health effect criterion (the 30 d RBE-weighted absorbed dose values of 0.25 Gy-Eq to bone marrow or 1 Gy-Eq to the lungs for adults). For the four radionuclides considered in this project, the stochastic health effect criterion applies. NCRP 161 further recommends that for inhalation exposure, a particle size of 5 µm activity median aerodynamic diameter (AMAD) may be used in the derivation of the CDGs as it is judged to be a reasonable default particle size because intakes of clinical significance are more likely to occur near the point of release where the sizes of airborne particles are usually the largest and the concentrations of airborne radionuclides are usually highest (6) . Among the four radionuclides, 106 Ru would give the highest CED if the release scenario was the same as the Chernobyl accident. For a CED of 0.25 Sv, using the default inhalation solubility (type M) for 106 Ru according to ICRP 71 (7) and calculating the intake and bioassay quantities using IMBA Plus (8) . The spiked urine sample was then divided into 250 mL aliquots; one was sent to each participating laboratory by a commercial courier without freezing. Laboratories were required to report results within 72 h following receipt of the sample. The 250 mL sample size was chosen to enable all of the laboratories to use their existing analytical methods, however, in an emergency situation, a laboratory would only expect to receive about 30-100 mL of urine on average based on past public health emergency responses (CDC personal communication).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Response to reporting schedule A message was sent to the participating laboratories immediately after the samples were picked up by the courier. The majority of the laboratories received the samples within 3 days. A small number of them experienced a short delay mainly due to customs clearance. One laboratory ultimately withdrew from this exercise after discovering that customs clearance would take up to a month.
Overall, 15 of the participating laboratories submitted their reports within 72 h of receiving the sample (the required reporting schedule). Three laboratories started late as a result of a scheduling conflict with other work commitments or instrument breakdown, but submitted their reports within 72 h. Considering the fact that the radionuclides in the sample are unknown to the participating laboratories, identification and quantification of different radionuclides require different methods and techniques, and the measurement of radionuclides at low levels takes time, reporting the results within the required reporting schedule of 72 h is acceptable. However, it is worthwhile to note that during a real emergency, when faced with hundreds to thousands of samples, laboratories are expected to have very short turnaround time for sample analysis and reporting so to support decisions on medical intervention.
Reported procedures for screening the sample
The laboratories did not know what radionuclides were spiked in the sample, or the activity levels. The participating laboratories were only notified that the urine sample simulates a collection from an individual who was contaminated during a severe nuclear power plant accident and that the selection of radionuclides was simplified for the purpose of this exercise.
Screening the sample using available instrumentation and procedures before assaying specific radionuclides can help identify certain radionuclides in the sample, for example, if beta/alpha emitters are present, or even provide qualitative evaluation on the activity levels of certain radionuclides, depending on the instrumentation and procedures used. Eleven out of the 18 participating laboratories screened the samples before performing assays for specific radionuclides. All of them screened using gamma spectrometry using the whole or a fraction of the sample received (L02, L03, L05, L06, L08, L09, L10, L13, L17, L18, and L19), while four of them (L02, L03, L09, and L10) also screened for gross beta/alpha using liquid scintillation counting. Results from such screening can help in selecting the methods/techniques for assaying specific radionuclides, determining the size of sub-samples for different analyses, and allocating the time for sample preparation and measurements.
Reported methods and techniques for assaying individual radionuclides
Splitting the sample received (250 mL) into subsamples for the assays of different radionuclides using different methods/techniques is the common approach of many participating laboratories. This allows the assays for different radionuclides to be carried out at the same time and ultimately helps reduce the sample turnaround time. High resolution gamma spectrometry was used for assaying both 137 Cs (photon peak of 662 keV for 137m Ba) and 106 Ru (photon peak of 622 keV for 106 Rh) in the sample by 15 out of the 18 participating laboratories, with the volume of sub-sample varying from 10 mL to 250 mL and the counting time varying from 15 min to 64 h. All 15 laboratories identified and quantified 137 Cs in the sample, but three of them missed 106 Ru. This was mainly caused by the small volume of sub-sample and/or the short counting time used, as the photon peak area of 106 Y, using liquid scintillation counting, gas flow proportional counting or Č herenkov counting.
Thirteen participating laboratories reported results for 239 Pu with one of them reporting a level of less than the detection limit of the method used (70 mBq/L). The measurement of 239 Pu in the sample was made either using inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS, L02) or using alpha spectrometry (the other 12 laboratories) following extensive sample preparation, which involves adding tracers to the sub-sample, precipitating the analyte using calcium (and magnesium for one laboratory) phosphate, decomposing the precipitate using HNO 3 (and H 2 O 2 in some laboratories) with or without a microwave system, separating the analyte using anion exchange chromatography and/or solid phase extraction chromatography, preparing the source using lanthanide fluoride micro-precipitation or electrodeposition on stainless steel discs, and counting the source using alpha spectrometry. The volume of the sub-sample and the counting time used for the measurement of 239 Pu in the sample varied significantly among the laboratories, which resulted in a wide range of detection limits and measurement accuracy.
As described above, the measurements of 239 Pu and 90 Sr in the sample involved chemical separation steps. Tracers, such as 242 Pu for 239 Pu, and carrier, such as stable strontium for 90 Sr, were used by many of the participating laboratories. The use of tracer or carrier allows the monitoring of chemical recoveries and correction of the final assay results.
Five laboratories applied procedures for sequential separation of the radionuclides in the sample, using either an ion exchange column (L05, L08, L09) or a stack of solid phase extraction columns (L06, L12). A procedure with sequential separation capability allows the separation of multiple radionuclides in one sample, avoids splitting the sample for the assays of different radionuclides, saves time in sample preparation, and improves the quality of assay results.
ICP-MS is a rapidly growing technique for the measurement of trace elements. It has been applied to the measurements of radionuclides in human and environmental samples thanks to its super sensitivity. As demonstrated by one laboratory (L02), 239 Pu in the urine sample can be quantified using only 1 mL of the sample, by ICP-MS in conjunction with solid phase extraction and an efficient sample introduction system. However, as the concentrations of the radionuclides involved in this exercise are very low, without appropriate sample preparation (for chemical purification) and specialized sample introduction to ICP-MS for enhanced ion transport efficiency, it would not be possible to measure them using ICP-MS due to insufficient limits of detection (L01, L08, L16).
It is worthwhile to note that many laboratories reported their efforts in identifying and quantifying many other radionuclides, namely 3 Cm, which are not involved in this exercise but are very relevant to the scenario communicated to the laboratories. In a realistic severe nuclear power plant accident, some of them might be present in the bioassay samples collected from the affected individuals. Table 2 and Figures 1-4 present the bioassay results reported by the participating laboratories with uncertainties at 95% confidence interval (CI). The reported concentrations of the radionuclides in the sample are quite close to the spiked levels (Table 1) in this exercise, with a small number of exceptions (e.g. 137 Cs reported by L16 and 90 Sr reported by L09). The reported uncertainties for all of the four radionuclides vary significantly. This is caused mainly by the differences in the volume of the subsample, assay method or technique, and the counting time used by the participating laboratories. The methods used to estimate assay uncertainties by the laboratories vary, but most of them follow the established methods for uncertainty estimation and propagation, published as national or international standards. It is worthwhile to note that there are no published acceptance criteria for emergency bioassay. International organizations, such as ISO, may consider the feasibility of developing such criteria.
Reported bioassay results
As discussed above, investigations would inform the key radionuclides released from the incident. However, sometimes the radionuclides information may not be immediately available. Laboratories performing bioassay may need to screen the samples to identify the radionuclides involved, select the methods/techniques for assaying each of them, determine the sizes of subsamples for different analyses, and allocate time for sample preparation and measurements. In this exercise, eight of the participating laboratories did not report their efforts in sample screening; they only reported the assays of specific radionuclides in the sample. Only six of the 19 participating laboratories reported results for all of the four radionuclides. The other laboratories reported results for some or none of them. These laboratories may not have the methods and techniques to identify and/or quantify all of the radionuclides (alpha, beta and gamma emitters); some laboratories may only be equipped with gamma spectrometers while some others may only be equipped with ICP-MS.
This exercise reveals that, generally, participating laboratories have the technical capacity to assess internal contamination to support effective public health and medical response to a nuclear emergency, although for some of them, their capacity is quite limited. To be useful in a response, in addition to being accurate, assessments must also be timely and sometimes need to be done with a smaller volume of sample (say, 30-100 mL). In the event of a large-scale emergency that overwhelms national bioassay capacity, delivering a timely result will require efficient international coordination among laboratories, including sharing samples and delivering results. Although efforts within GHSI, WHO, and IAEA have made notable progress towards establishing international laboratory networks to provide surge capacity and related assistance to support an emergency response, results from this exercise indicate that challenges remain to ensure that results are delivered in a timely, consistent and reliable manner to support medical interventions.
Recommendations
The GHSI Laboratory Network for Emergency Radionuclide Bioassay has been working on identifying the gaps and developing capabilities and surge capacity for responding to a RN emergency. This informal laboratory network is complementary to the assistance capabilities established through RANET (IAEA) and REMPAN (WHO). It is recommended that the three networks further strengthen their collaborations and leverage their efforts in developing the global capabilities and capacity for emergency radionuclide bioassay, including: (1) organizing a technical workshop to facilitate exchanges and learning among the laboratories; (2) initiating a laboratory hands-on training program among laboratories; and (3) developing a practical plan for coordinating sample sharing and analysis, and integrating this plan into national emergency preparedness and response. These recommendations are those of the GHSI laboratory network and based on information gathered from the two exercises. These recommendations do not represent one particular agency. 
